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Abstract: This paper examines the change in welfare in Ireland over the 1987-
1994 period by investigating whether Lorenz and Generalised Lorenz dominance 
can be observed for household expenditure data.  It also calculates bootstrapped 
standard error measures for Lorenz and Generalised Lorenz curves and finds 
that the Generalised Lorenz curve for 1994 lies everywhere above that for 1987 
thus indicating dominance.  It also investigates whether welfare rose using more 
specific social welfare measures based on average expenditure and the Gini 
coefficient and finds a statistically significant rise in social welfare. Was Ireland Better Off in 1994 than in 1987? 
 
1. Introduction 
The answer to the question posed in the title can be answered in a number of ways.  
Perhaps the most standard way is to compare some measure of income per head (such as 
GNP or GDP) in 1994 to a similar measure evaluated in 1987, adjusted for prices, and then 
compare the two.  However, evaluating whether a country is “better off” purely by looking 
at income per head is not without problems as any introductory economics textbook will 
outline.  A measure such as GNP/GDP per head only includes marketed output.  Thus no 
value is placed upon voluntary activities.  There is no account taken of leisure nor of the 
environment.  GNP/GDP per head also only takes account of average income per head and 
has nothing to say about the distribution of income.  For example, society may prefer a more 
equal distribution of income to a less equal one, and may be prepared to sacrifice some 
income to achieve this.
1  It is this latter issue that is addressed in this paper.  We try to 
examine whether Ireland was better off in 1994 compared to 1987 using measures which 
take account of income per head and its distribution. 
When making comparisons on the basis of average income and its distribution the 
principal issue to be resolved is the trade-off between the level of income and how equally it 
is distributed.  The adoption of a specific social welfare function resolves this issue by 
incorporating an explicit trade-off between average income and its distribution.
2  The 
problem of course is that it may be quite difficult to find agreement on exactly which social 
welfare function to adopt.  However, it may be possible to find agreement on certain broad 
properties that a social welfare function should have.  For example, there may be agreement 
that an increase in average incomes, ceteris paribus, should lead to a rise in social welfare.  It 
may also be possible for society to agree that a transfer of income from a richer to a poorer 
person (thus keeping average income unchanged but making the distribution of income 
more equal) should lead to a rise (or at least not a fall) in social welfare.  Atkinson (1970) and 
Shorrocks (1983) have shown that for certain broad properties it may be possible to find 
                                                 
1 We assume that when making static comparisons between two distributions of income more equality is always 
preferable to less equality.  The possibility that the level of inequality may affect the growth of income is not 
addressed here (see Alesina and Rodrik, 1994,  Personn and Tabellini, 1994, and Welch, 1999, for a discussion 
of these issues).  
2 Thus the only information entering the social welfare function is information regarding income.  Sen (1977) 
discusses the informational content of social welfare functions.  dominance relationships.  In other words, as long as we can find agreement on certain broad 
properties which a social welfare function should possess, then it is possible to make 
unambiguous statements regarding changes in social welfare i.e. all welfare functions 
possessing these properties will show a rise/fall in social welfare.  This gets around the 
problem of our results regarding changes in social welfare being sensitive to the specific 
welfare function chosen.  If such dominance relationships can not be found then it is always 
possible to find social welfare functions which will rank situations differently. 
This paper examines whether such dominance relationships exist for Ireland when 
comparing social welfare in the two years 1987 and 1994.  If dominance can be found then it 
is possible to state that for a broad class of social welfare functions, Ireland was “better off” 
in 1994 compared to 1987.  If dominance can not be found then specific social welfare 
functions can be evaluated for 1987 and 1994, bearing in mind that it will always be possible 
to find another social welfare function which will rank the two years differently. 
The layout of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we give a more detailed (but still brief!) 
account of social welfare functions and dominance relationships.  In section 3 we describe 
our data set and discuss precisely which measure of “income” should be used.  Section 4 
attempts to answer the question posed in the title by investigating whether dominance 
results hold and also looks at some specific social welfare functions.  Section 5 presents 
concluding comments. 
 
2. Social Welfare Functions and Dominance 
For our purposes here, the two seminal papers in the area are those by Atkinson (1970) 
and Shorrocks (1983).  Atkinson (1970) demonstrated the link between Lorenz dominance 
and social welfare when average incomes in the two situations under comparison are equal.  
Shorrocks (1983) introduced the Generalised Lorenz curve to take account of the case where 
average incomes differ.  Before outlining these results it is necessary to introduce some 
notation. 
Suppose we have a distribution of income across N recipients which we represent in 
discrete form by  N y y y ... 2 1 £ £ .  The Lorenz curve can then be defined by  
￿
=






















 thus giving the income shares of fractions 1/N, 2/N, 3/N…of the 
population cumulated upwards from the lowest income  1 y . 
If we assume that income is continuously distributed then  N y y y ... 2 1 £ £  can be 
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More intuitively, the Lorenz curve can be obtained by ordering all income units, starting 
with the lowest, and plotting, against the cumulative proportion of the population so ordered 
(running from zero to one along the horizontal axis) the cumulative proportion of income 
received by these units.  This gives us a curve like Figure 1.   
 
If everybody received the same income then the “curve” would be a straight line from 
(0,0) to (1,1) i.e. a perfect diagonal.  If there is any inequality in the distribution of income 
than the Lorenz curve will lie below the perfect diagonal.  Intuitively the further below the 
Figure 1: Lorenz Curve 
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Income diagonal the curve is, the more unequal is the income distribution.  Thus if we wished to 
represent two income distributions by Lorenz curves, and one Lorenz curve lay everywhere 
below the other, then that income distribution is more unequal.  This gives rise to the idea of 
“Lorenz Dominance”.  More formally, suppose we have two distributions,  ) ( y F  and  ) ( y G , 
with associated Lorenz curves  ) ( p L F  and  ) ( p LG  then we say that distribution F Lorenz 
Dominates distribution G if  ] 1 , 0 [ ) ( ) ( ˛ " ‡ p p L p L G F  and  G F L L „ .  Note that Lorenz 
curves are independent of scale, so that if distribution F was simply a scaled up version of 
distribution G then their Lorenz curves would be equal. 
However, what if there is no Lorenz dominance i.e. if the Lorenz curves cross?  Then it 
is not possible to unambiguously rank one distribution as more unequal that the other.  It 
will always be possible to find two inequality measures giving a different ranking. 
What is the relationship between Lorenz curves and social welfare?  First we have to 
define social welfare.  Suppose that to each level of income, y, we assign a level of utility, 
) ( y U , then we can regard the average utility in society as  ￿ = dy y f y U W ) ( ) ( .  Then we can 
compare the level of social welfare associated with different distributions.  Of course, this is 
a very specific definition of utility and also of social welfare.  It assumes that individual utility 
is a function of own-income only and that social welfare can be regarded as simply the 
aggregate of individual utilities. 
We can now state the first fundamental result, due to Atkinson (1970), relating Lorenz 
curves to social welfare.  Suppose  ) ( y F  and  ) ( y G  are two income distributions with equal 
means  G F m m = , then  ) ( ) ( p L p L G F ‡  for all  ￿ ￿ ‡ ￿ ˛ dy y g y U dy y f y U p ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ] 1 , 0 [  
for every function  ) ( y U such that  0 ) ( > ¢ y U  and  0 ) ( < ¢ ¢ y U .  Thus providing individual 
utility functions are increasing and strictly concave in incomes, if a distribution F Lorenz 
dominates another distribution G, then social welfare under F will be higher than under G, 
provided average incomes are the same.  Thus in this case Lorenz dominance is equivalent to 
social welfare dominance.  Note how strong a result this is.  Providing we are willing to agree 
that utility functions should be increasing and concave in income then provided Lorenz 
dominance is observed we can make an unambiguous welfare statement.  If Lorenz 
dominance is not observed, then no unambiguous social welfare ranking can be obtained.  If  
Lorenz curves cross, then it is always possible to find two increasing and concave social welfare functions which will rank the two income distributions differently.  To obtain a 
ranking it will be necessary to put more restrictions on the form of the social welfare 
function, with the increasing risk that it will not be possible to find agreement on what those 
restrictions should be. 
What about the assumption of concavity of the utility function  ) ( y U ?  This 
assumption can be justified on two grounds.  First, if  ) ( y U  is a true representation of 
individual preferences then it can be justified on the grounds of diminishing marginal utility 
of income.  Alternatively it can be regarded as the preferences of a social planner who is 
inequality averse and places a higher weight on the utility of the less well-off.  Under either 
interpretation it implies that a transfer of income from a less well-off person to a more well-
off person will lead to a fall in average utility or social welfare. 
While Atkinson’s result is a strong one, in practice it is rarely the case that the 
distributions being ranked have the same mean.  To overcome this, Shorrocks (1983) 
introduced the Generalised Lorenz Curve.  This is analogous to the ordinary Lorenz curve but 
instead of the cumulated proportion of income on the vertical axis, we have the cumulated 
income per head.  Thus the Lorenz curve for distribution F, instead of going from (0,0) to 
(1,1) will go from (0,0) to (1, F m ).  Formally the definition of the Generalised Lorenz curve is 
￿ = = ￿ =
*
0
* ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
y
F F F p L dy y yf p GL y F p m .  Figure 2 illustrates generalised Lorenz 
curves for two distributions, F and G, where  G F m m > . 
In the case of Generalised Lorenz curves the relationship between dominance and 
social welfare is then given by the following result: if  ) ( y F  and  ) ( y G  are two income 
distributions then ￿ ￿ ‡ dy y g y U dy y f y U ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  for all increasing strictly concave 
) ( ) ( ) ( p GL p GL y U G F ‡ ￿  for all  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ p .  So once again we get the extremely powerful 
result that if Generalised Lorenz dominance holds welfare dominance can be inferred for all 
increasing strictly concave social welfare functions.  If Generalised Lorenz dominance does 
not hold and the GL curves cross then it is always possible to find two increasing and 
concave social welfare functions which will rank the two income distributions differently.
3 
 Figure 2: Generalised  Lorenz Curves 
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Thus returning to the question posed in the title, if we observe Generalised Lorenz 
dominance for Ireland for 1994 over 1987 we will be able to assert that Ireland was indeed 
better off in the latter year, presuming we equate “better off” with having higher social 
welfare and there is general agreement on the use of an increasing concave social welfare 
function.  We now investigate whether this is in fact the case. 
 
3. Generalised Lorenz Dominance in Ireland 1987-94. 
In this section we investigate whether Generalised Lorenz dominance held in Ireland 
when comparing 1994 with 1987.  If the answer is “yes” then it seems reasonable to suggest 
that Ireland was better off in 1994.  If the answer is “no” then the situation is less clearcut 
and we will try to answer the question using more specific and restrictive social welfare 
functions.  
In this section we apply the ideas from section 2 to data from the Irish Household 
Budget Surveys (HBS) of 1987 and 1994.  These are nationally representative surveys carried 
out every seven years and collect a variety of information concerning in excess of 7000 
households.  Households answer questions over a two-week period about consumption 
patterns, sources of income plus other information regarding demographic and housing 
circumstances etc..  Before carrying out the empirical work we must decide on exactly what 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Kakwani (1984) examines welfare distributions and finds that for 40 out of 248 pairwise comparisons it is not 
possible to rank distributions via either Atkinson’s or Shorrocks’ theorem. measure of income should be used.  In the discussion so far we have been assuming that a 
satisfactory and non-controversial measure of income is available.  In fact this is not the 
case.  Given our data, we have a choice between “income” or “expenditure”. Broadly the 
issues are as follows
4: certain components of income are difficult to measure e.g. income 
from self-employment.  Perhaps more importantly cross-section studies typically provide 
income measures which are snapshots in time and thus take no account of the difference 
between transitory and permanent income.  Since consumption/expenditure decisions are 
usually made with reference to permanent income then expenditure measures may be 
preferable.  However, such measures also have drawbacks.  Expenditure on items such as 
alcohol and tobacco are typically under-reported.  Also, as mentioned above, expenditure 
over a two-week period may not be a reliable measure of consumption, particularly for 
mature households who may have a large stock of durables from which they derive services.   
However a further problem specific to the HBS is that income observations are “top-
coded” i.e. values of income in excess of £800 per week are simply entered as £800 per 
week.  Thus the distribution of income is censored on the right hand side at a value of £800.  
This will obviously influence the calculation of both ordinary and Generalised Lorenz 
curves. Given these problems its seems best to use total expenditure as our measure of 
“income”. 
A further issue concerns adjustments which must be made for family size.  Since we are 
examining expenditure for families of differing sizes and composition it is necessary to adjust 
our measures of expenditure by the appropriate equivalence scale. There is an extensive 
literature on the appropriate choice of equivalence scale.
5 Here we use a scale which has 
been widely used in poverty studies in the EU.  It is the same as scale “C” used by Callan et 
al (1996) and is also used by O’Neill and Sweetman (1998).  The weights are 1 for the first 
adult in the household, 0.7 for additional people aged over 14 and 0.5 for people aged less 
than 14.  
Below we present some summary statistics regarding the change in average equivalised 
expenditure for 1987 and 1994 (in 1987 prices).  It is worth noting that total GNP (in 
constant prices) rose by over 33% and GNP per head by 32% over the same period.  This 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion see Blundell and Preston (1998). 
5 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for a discussion. discrepancy between the change in income and the change in expenditure is a feature of the 
data over the period and is a topic we hope to return to in future work. 
Table 1: Summary of Weekly Equivalised Expenditure 1987 and 1994 (1987 prices) 
  1987 (N=7705)  1994 (N=7877)  % change 
Average Equivalised Exp  94.32717  100.2334  +6.261 
Standard Deviation  63.69861  64.98494   
  
First of all we will compare inequality between 1987 and 1994, ignoring for the 
moment the change in mean weekly equivalised expenditure i.e. we examine Lorenz curves 
only.  In table 2 we present Lorenz ordinates for 1987 and 1994. 
 
Table 2: Lorenz Ordinates by Decile, 1987-1994 (s.e. in brackets) 
Decile  1987  1994  % change  Test Statistic 
1




-2.17  30.24845** 
2




-1.86  38.70002** 
3




-1.62  42.58182** 
4




-1.41  43.4664** 
5




-1.07  37.33829** 
6




-0.44  18.38739** 
7




0.20  -10.4976** 
8




0.69  -47.0909** 
9




0.88  -72.0985**  
The results here appear to suggest that we do not observe Lorenz dominance.  For 
deciles one to six the Lorenz curve for 1987 lies above that of 1994, but for deciles seven to 
nine it lies below.  Thus the Lorenz curves cross and no unambiguous statement can be 
made regarding the change in inequality. 
However, we must bear in mind that our Lorenz curves are derived from sample 
data and are thus subject to sampling variability.  We also include measures of the standard 
errors of the ordinates plus the test statistics for the null hypothesis that the ordinates differ.
6  
Suppose that  i L  is the i
th Lorenz ordinate ( ) ,.. 2 , 1 ( k i = , where the k
th ordinate is equal to 
one.  Then, given estimated Lorenz ordinates from two samples a and b with sample sizes 
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In large samples,  i T  is asymptotically normally distributed.  Bishop, Formby and 
Smith (1991) suggest the following criteria when testing for Lorenz dominance: if there is at 
least one positive significant difference and no negative significant differences between 
Lorenz ordinates then dominance holds.  Two distributions are ranked as equivalent if there 
are no significant differences, while the curves cross if the difference in at least one set of 
ordinates is positive and significant while at least one other set is negative and significant. 
As we can see from table 2, under the Bishop, Formby and Smith criteria we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the Lorenz curves cross. 
What about Generalised Lorenz dominance?  In table 3 we present ordinates for the 
Generalised Lorenz curves. 
                                                 
6 Standard errors for the ordinates are calculated via the bootstrap method.  See Mills and Zandvakili (1997) for 
a comparison of bootstrapped standard errors compared to asymptotic standard errors.  
Table3: Generalised Lorenz Ordinates by Decile, 1987-1994 (s.e. in brackets) 
Decile  1987  1994  % change  Test Statistic 
1




3.95  -53.5821** 
2




4.29  -84.7913** 
3




4.54  -113.683** 
4




4.77  -145.14** 
5




5.13  -172.17** 
6




5.80  -230.667** 
7




6.48  -309.631** 
8




7.00  -376.922** 
9




7.20  -488.709** 




6.26   
 
The results in table 3 suggest that we can make an unambiguous statement regarding 
the change in welfare between 1987 and 1994.  Given that the Generalised Lorenz curve for 
1994 is everywhere above that for 1987, then all social welfare functions which are increasing 
and convex in expenditure show an increase in social welfare over the period.  We also see 
from the test statistics that this dominance result is statistically significant. 
In some respects this is a very strong statement to make.  Yet it only has validity if 
we accept the form of both the individual utility functions  ) ( y U  and their average as a measure of social welfare.  As pointed out above, our version of  ) ( y U  implies that own-
utility is a function of own-income only.  Might our results change if we modify this 
assumption?  This is discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Functions 
The assumption that individual utility is a function of own-income only can be 
challenged on a number of fronts.  First, if utility is dependent upon income only then a 
whole host of potentially relevant information is being ignored.  To give just a simple 
example, this form of the utility function takes no account of the utility arising from leisure.  
Nor does it include less tangible, but still important factors such as the value of the 
environment or the “quality of life”.   The kind of data provided in surveys such as the HBS 
typically does not include such information, so while acknowledging its importance we will 
not be taking account of it. 
Even if we could incorporate such features into the utility function, it is arguable that 
non-utility factors should also be included in social welfare.  Sen’s example of the sadist 
gaining more utility from torture than his victim loses may appear somewhat fanciful, but it 
does bring home the point that rights as well as utilities should ideally feature in measures of 
social welfare.  Once again however, given the data at our disposal, we cannot address this 
problem. 
Finally, it could be argued that utility should not be individualistic i.e. dependent just upon 
own-income or own-leisure.  Survey evidence suggests that it is not just own-income but 
also the incomes of others, particularly those in peer groups, that affects utility.  There are a 
variety of mechanisms whereby this can come about.  For example, Runciman (1966) 
introduced the notion of relative deprivation.  In this case an individual’s utility is a function not 
just of the commodities (income) he has but also the foregone utility through not having 
commodities (income) which other persons have.  The deprivation approach assumes that 
the value (marginal utility) of a commodity to the individual, other things being equal, is an 
increasing function of its scarcity value to the individual.  The degree of deprivation inherent 
in not having something (say the jth unit of income) is an increasing function of the number 
of those who have it, or a decreasing function of the number who do not.  Thus externalities 
are introduced, since the marginal utility of income is a function of the income distribution 
as a whole. Thus the scarcity of a unit of income, 
* y  is  ) (
* y F , the cumulative income distribution 
and  ) ( 1
* y F -  is the frequency of individuals with income above 
* y .  Let 
0 )], ( 1 [
* > ¢ - h y F h , be the marginal welfare of income.  The deprivation of the ith 
individual is then given by  ￿ - =
max





dy y F h y d  where  max y is the maximum income in 
society so that the integration is over the range of incomes of which the ith individual is 
deprived.  The welfare of the ith individual is given by  ￿ - =
i y
i dy y F h y U
0
)] ( 1 [ ) ( . 
If aggregate welfare and deprivation are given respectively as  ￿ =
max
0
) ( ) (
y




) ( ) (
y
dy y f y d D , then Yitzhaki (1979) shows that if  ) ( 1 )] ( 1 [ i i y F y F h - = - , then 
) 1 ( G W - = m  and  G D m =  where m  is average income and G is the Gini coefficient.  Thus 
this gives us an (admittedly restrictive) measure of welfare based upon a non-individualistic 
individual utility function.  
One attractive generalisation of the above approach is to assume that 
0 , )] ( 1 [ )] ( 1 [ > - = - v y F y F h
v
i i .  We then obtain the result that  )] ( 1 [ v G W - = m  where 
G(v) is Yitzhaki’s extended Gini and v is a parameter influencing the weight attached to the 
lower end of the distribution.  If  0 = v  then  m = W  while  ¥ ﬁ v  leads to  i i y W min =  i.e. 
the Rawlsian criterion.   
In table 4 below we present estimated Gini coefficients (with bootstrapped standard 
errors) and the associated welfare and deprivation measures for 1987 and 1994. Table 4: Gini Coefficients and Welfare and Deprivation Measures, 1987-1994 
  1987  1994  % change  Test statistic 




-0.107  7.363941 




+6.317  490.674 




+6.148  234.869 
 
We see that inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient fell slightly between 1987 and 
1994 and this fall is also statistically significant.  Welfare rose by over 6% and this too is 
statistically significant.  Paradoxically measured deprivation also rose by over 6%.  Since the 
deprivation measure is concerned with “not-having”, as average income rises then the 
amount which people “do not have” also rises.  Then since the change in the Gini is only 
marginal, while average expenditure rises by just over 6%, measured deprivation rises by 
approximately the same amount as does average expenditure. 
What about the extended Gini where the v parameter can be altered to reflect increasing 
concern for the welfare of those at the lower end of the expenditure distribution?  Table 5 
essentially reproduces table 4 except that we include three different values of v, viz. 3, 5 and 
8, with the associated test statistics. 
 
Table 5: % Change in Extended Gini and Welfare and Deprivation Measures, 
1987-1994 (test statistic in brackets) 





















 Once again we observe the paradoxical situation that both measured welfare and 
measured deprivation have increased.  It is also noticeable that the rise in measured 
deprivation is now greater than the rise in welfare.  This is because higher values of the v 
parameter imply a higher weight is being put on the lower part of the expenditure 
distribution.  As table 2 shows, the Lorenz curve for 1994 is further from the diagonal than 
that for 1987 at the lower end of the expenditure distribution.  Since this part of the 
distribution now receives a higher weight, we see a larger rise in deprivation. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to answer the question whether welfare in Ireland rose over 
the period 1987-94, where welfare is interpreted as depending upon average expenditure and 
its distribution.  Using dominance results of Atkinson and Shorrocks we show that all social 
welfare functions based upon increasing, individualistic and concave utility functions would 
show a statistically significant rise in social welfare over the period.  We also show that when 
the assumption of an individualistic utility function is dropped and a more specific social 
welfare function is adopted, measured welfare still rises and this rise is statistically significant.  
Moreover, this results holds for a variety of assumptions regarding the weight to be put 
upon the welfare of those at the lower end of the expenditure distribution. References 
 
Alesina, A., and D. Rodrik (1994): “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, pp. 465-490. 
 
Atkinson, A.B., (1970): “On the Measurement of Inequality”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 
2, pp. 244-263. 
 
Bishop. J.A. J. Formby and W.J. Smith (1991): “Lorenz Dominance and Welfare: 
Changes in the U.S. Distribution of Income, 1967-1986 “, Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 73, pp. 134-139. 
 
Blundell, R., and I. Preston (1998): “Consumption Inequality and Income Uncertainty”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics,  
 
Callan, T., B. Nolan, B. Whelan, C. Whelan and J. Williams (1996): Poverty in the 1990s: 
Evidence from the Living in Ireland Survey. Dublin: Oak Tree Press. 
 
Deaton, A., and J. Muellbauer (1980): Economics and Consumer Behaviour. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kakwani, N., (1984): “Welfare Ranking of Distributions”, Advances in Econometrics, Vol. 3, 
pp. 191-213. 
 
Mills, J., and S. Zandvakili (1997): “Statistical Inference via Bootstrapping for Measures of 
Inequality”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 12, pp. 133-150. 
 
O’Neill, D., and O. Sweetman (1998): “Poverty and Inequality in Ireland 1987-1994: A 
Comparison Using Measures of Income and Consumption”, mimeo. 
 
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini (1994): “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 84, pp. 600-621. 
 
Runciman, W.G., (1966): Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul/Penguin Books. 
 
Sen, A.K., (1977): “On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare 
Analysis”, Econometrica, Vol. 45, pp. 1539-72. 
 
Shorrocks, A., (1983): “Ranking Income Distributions”, Economica, Vol. 50, pp.1-17. 
 
Welch, F., (1999): “In Defence of Inequality”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89, pp. 1-17. 
 
Yitzhaki, S., (1979): “Relative Deprivation and the Gini Coefficient”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 93, pp. 321-324. How do we answer the question in the title? 
 
 
Examine GNP/GDP per head? 
 
 






And the “quality of life”? 
 
 








What general properties should a SWF possess? 
 
 
(1) More is better! 
 
 




If situation A ranked better than situation B for all SWFs 











Distribution F Lorenz Dominates distribution G if 
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But what is relation to social welfare?  
Suppose that to each level of income, y, we assign a 
level of utility,  ) (y U , then we can regard the average 
utility in society as  ￿ = dy y f y U W ) ( ) ( .   
 
 
Then Atkinson’s Theorem says: 
 
 
Suppose  ) (y F  and  ) (y G  are two income distributions 
with equal means 
G F m m = , then  ) ( ) ( p L p L
G F ‡  for all 
￿ ￿ ‡ ￿ ˛ dy y g y U dy y f y U p ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ] , [ 1 0  for every 
function  ) (y U such that  0 > ¢ ) (y U  and  0 < ¢ ¢ ) (y U .   
 
 
i.e. link between Lorenz dominance and welfare 
dominance, provided we are happy about form of 
) (y U  and  ￿ = dy y f y U W ) ( ) (  But what if 
G F m m „ ?  Would we prefer a larger cake 
less equally distributed? 
 
 




Then we have Shorrocks’ Thoerem: 
 
 
if  ) (y F  and  ) (y G  are two income distributions then 
￿ ￿ ‡ dy y g y U dy y f y U ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  for all increasing strictly 
concave  ) ( ) ( ) ( p GL p GL y U
G F ‡ ￿  for all  ] , [ 1 0 ˛ p . 
 
 
i.e. generalisation of Atkinson for case of 
G F m m „  We analyse Irish data for 1987 and 1994 and examine 
for Lorenz and Generalised Lorenz Dominance 
 
 
Table 2: Lorenz Ordinates by Decile, 1987-1994 (s.e. in brackets) 
Decile  1987  1994  % change  Test Statistic 
1




-2.17  30.24845** 
2




-1.86  38.70002** 
3




-1.62  42.58182** 
4




-1.41  43.4664** 
5




-1.07  37.33829** 
6




-0.44  18.38739** 
7




0.20  -10.4976** 
8




0.69  -47.0909** 
9




0.88  -72.0985** 
 What about Generalised Lorenz Dominance? 
 
Table3: Generalised Lorenz Ordinates by Decile, 1987-1994 (s.e. in 
brackets) 
Decile  1987  1994  % change  Test Statistic 
1




3.95  -53.5821** 
2




4.29  -84.7913** 
3




4.54  -113.683** 
4




4.77  -145.14** 
5




5.13  -172.17** 
6




5.80  -230.667** 
7




6.48  -309.631** 
8




7.00  -376.922** 
9




7.20  -488.709** 




6.26   
 So has question been answered unambiguously? 
 
 
What about form of  ) (y U ? 
 
 




Also dependent upon own-income only 
 
 
Relative Deprivation:  utility also a function of what you 
don’t  have Scarcity of a unit of income, 
* y  is  ) (
* y F , the 
cumulative income distribution and  ) (
* y F - 1  is the 
frequency of individuals with income above 




  Let  0 1 > ¢ - h y F h )], ( [
* , be the marginal welfare of 
income.  The deprivation of the ith individual is then 
given by  ￿ - =
max





dy y F h y d 1  where 
max y is the 
maximum income in society so that the integration is 





  The welfare of the ith individual is given by 
￿ - =
i y
i dy y F h y U
0
1 )] ( [ ) ( . 
 
 If aggregate welfare and deprivation are given 
respectively as  ￿ =
max
) ( ) (
y





) ( ) (
y
dy y f y d D
0
, then Yitzhaki (1979) shows that if 
) ( )] ( [
i i y F y F h - = - 1 1 , then  ) ( G W - = 1 m  and  G D m =  
where m is average income and G is the Gini coefficient.   
 
 
If  0 1 1 > - = - v y F y F h
v
i i , )] ( [ )] ( [ , then   )] ( [ v G W - = 1 m  
where G(v) is Yitzhaki’s extended Gini and v is a 
parameter influencing the weight attached to the lower 
end of the distribution. Table 4: Gini Coefficients and Welfare and Deprivation Measures, 
1987-1994 







-0.107  7.363941 











+6.148  234.869 
 
 
Table 5: % Change in Extended Gini and Welfare and Deprivation 
Measures, 1987-1994 (test statistic in brackets) 


























 “…rural Ireland’s boom of decades means that one 
can no longer even glimpse the magnificent sea on 
the road from Galway to An Ceathrú Rua.  Urban 
money means that the great Victorian red-brick Tara 
Street of my youth is no longer a street at all, but a 
mere gaggle of buildings.  Our economic buying 
power has developed more rapidly than our sense of 
value.  We will grow to regret these things.”  
 
Frank Barry in Understanding Ireland’s Economic 
Growth (ed. Barry). 
 
 
 
 